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Abstract
Autonomous vehicle control is well understood for local-
ization, mapping and planning in un-reactive environ-
ments, but the human factors of complex interactions
with other road users are not yet developed. This po-
sition paper presents an initial model for negotiation be-
tween an autonomous vehicle and another vehicle at an
unsigned intersections or (equivalently) with a pedestrian
at an unsigned road-crossing (jaywalking), using discrete
sequential game theory. The model is intended as a ba-
sic framework for more realistic and data-driven future
extensions. The model shows that when only vehicle po-
sition is used to signal intent, the optimal behaviors for
both agents must include a non-zero probability of al-
lowing a collision to occur. This suggests extensions to
reduce this probability in future, such as other forms of
signaling and control. Unlike most Game Theory appli-
cations in Economics, active vehicle control requires real-
time selection from multiple equilibria with no history,
and we present and argue for a novel solution concept,
meta-strategy convergence, suited to this task. 1
1 Introduction
Automated vehicle (AV) localization, mapping, and plan-
ning have recently become practically feasible due to price
falls in computer processing power. The problem of simul-
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taneous localization and mapping (SLAM) is well under-
stood [16], and despite its exact solution being NP-hard
[15], good approximations exist such as particle ﬁltering,
which make use of large compute power to draw samples
near solutions. Route planning in non-interactive envi-
ronments also has well known tractable solutions such as
the A-star algorithm. Given a route, localizing and con-
trol to follow that route then becomes a similar task to
that performed by the 1959 General Motors Firebird-III
self-driving car [1], which used electromagnetic sensing
to follow a wire built into the road. Such path follow-
ing, using wires or SLAM, can then be augmented with
simple safety logic to stop the vehicle if any obstacle is
in its way, as detected by any range sensor. Free and
open source systems for this level of `self-driving' are now
widely available [6].
In contrast, problems that these vehicles will face
around interacting with other road users are much harder
both to formulate and solve. Autonomous vehicles do not
just have to deal with inanimate objects, sensors, and
maps. They have to deal with other agents, currently
human drivers and pedestrians and eventually other au-
tonomous vehicles, all of which may be at least as in-
telligent and rational as they are, and in competition
with them for space, time and priority on the road. Re-
cent studies have shown [9] that in trials of autonomous
minibuses, pedestrians knowingly obstruct autonomous
vehicles around once every three hours  enough to occur
once every day on a long commute. Once human road
users know that AV safety systems are programmed to
stop if any obstacle is in their path, they can quickly take
advantage of this to push in front of the AV and take pri-
ority. If this becomes common knowledge across a whole
city, AVs will make little or no progress because they will
be forced to yield at every single interaction.
Understanding and predicting other agents' behavior,
especially when that includes understanding and predict-
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ing their understandings and predictions of oneself, and
of one's understanding and predictions of them, ad inﬁni-
tum, is a massively more complex problem than inferring
locations and maps. It may even be formally uncom-
putable as it requires predictions of and actions based
on one's future behavior (via the other party's models of
it), which are well known in Computer Science to lead to
paradox and uncomputability as in Gödel's theorem and
the Halting problem [17].
Game Theory provides some framework for managing
such self-referential decisions, but appears to be incom-
plete as a prescriptive theory when multiple equilibria
are present. Solutions may be formally computationally
intractable (NP-hard) in some cases [13]. And when mul-
tiple equilibria are present, it is not clear whether game
theory or any other rational line of argument will ever be
able to even formulate the problems, let alone solve them.
A simple example of game theory is the classic game
`Chicken', in which two cars each drive straight towards
each other at speed or swerve away, and the nominal loser
(the `chicken') is the one to swerve, but both players are
much bigger losers if they both do not swerve, and collide.
The classic formal Chicken model makes the strong and
unrealistic assumption that the straight/swerve decision
is made as a single action (a) selection, simultaneously
by both players (X and Y ) so that the payoﬀ values (v)
given the actions can be represented as a 2×2 matrix of
pairs (vYaY ,aX , v
X
aY ,aX ) :
Y \ X aX=swerve aX =straight
aY=swerve (0,0) (-1, +1)
aY =straight (+1, -1) (-100,-100)
The central concept of game theory is equilibrium [11]
which for a 2×2 matrix game as above describes any pair
of strategies for the two players such that if either player
knew the other's they would not change their own. Con-
ceptually, if equilibria exist then one can usually be found
via `ﬁctitious play', i.e. each player simulates her and her
opponent's behaviour in a virtual world where they know
each other's strategies, until they converge. Strategies
are probability distributions over actions. If a game has
only one equilibrium then it is optimal for both players
to play its strategies. When there are multiple equilib-
ria, the question of what to do is less clear. Historically,
Game Theory has focused on description of observed be-
haviors (how do people act? Why did the chicken cross
the road?) and mechanism design (how can government
make them act?) rather than prescription (when should
we act? When should the chicken cross the road?) of real-
time action selection by agents. This is due to its roots
in economics and mathematics rather than robotics. This
distinction becomes crucial when multiple equilibria are
present in a game. The descriptive school would say that
any of the equilibria are valid descriptions of what might
be observed in human behavior data [4]. The `mecha-
nism design' school typically argues [12] that the prob-
lem of equilibrium selection is `unpleasant' and should
be avoided by changing the rules of the game to pro-
duce a single unambiguous equilibrium which all players
can usefully use. For cases where the equilibrium selec-
tion problem cannot be avoided in these ways, many dif-
ferent solution concepts (aka. `equilibrium reﬁnements')
have been proposed and debated [2] for choosing between
them. Two of these are widely acknowledged to be `ratio-
nal' when applied in order: 1. Dominance - Clearly, if an
equilibrium is worse for all players than at least one other,
then we discard it without question; 2. Evolutionary sta-
bility / symmetry (ESS) - Assume everyone in the world
was to use the same equilibrium as me. Discard equilib-
ria where this would not work. These concepts help to
reduce the number of potential multiple equilibria but do
not guarantee reduction to a unique one. To discard fur-
ther equilibria, more controversial concepts have been de-
bated [2] including: 1. Trembling hand stability - Assume
other player has a small epsilon probability of making a
mistake; prefer equilibria that we converge back to if that
happens; 2. Basin size (aka. `risk dominance'). Assume
both players use ﬁctitious play starting from maximum
entropy strategies. Consider which equilibrium attracts
from the most start points, and this thus most likely to
occur. 3. Social maximum (aka. `payoﬀ dominance')
Choose the equilibrium with the largest sum of payoﬀs to
all players (even if I am worse oﬀ than in others). 4. Other
arbitrary conventions. Such as using the action with the
ﬁrst letter in the alphabet. These work only if all players
agree to use them in advance or can be argued to possess
social knowledge to make them conﬁdent that others will
choose the same ones as them. This appears to be the
point where the mathematics of Game Theory ends, and
philosophical debate about the meaning of `rationality'
takes its place [2]. However, as autonomous vehicle engi-
neers building real-time control systems, we must make
some action selection in these situations, somehow.
Chicken is intended as a simple educational example
game and not as a model of real vehicles. This study
modiﬁes it into a general and more realistic vehicle inter-
action problem, where an AV competes for priority with
another vehicle or a pedestrian stepping out in front of
it, and allowing them to negotiate with one another by
observing each others' behaviour over time. Initially we
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Figure 1: Scenario and model.
consider the simplest possible model of this class of prob-
lems, of an AV and another similar vehicle approaching
an unmarked intersection at speed as in ﬁg. 1(left). This
would also apply to the case of two pedestrians meeting
each other and negotiating for space. We then extend it
to cases where the two players have asymmetric penalties
in the event of collision  modeling an AV encountering
a potential jaywalker stepping into the road, or an AV
encountering a physically larger or smaller vehicle such
as an armored SUV or cyclist at an intersection. The
model proposed here is intended to be the simplest pos-
sible which captures the dynamics of interest common to
these cases, but which can also serve as a foundation for
many more complex ones.
Game theory is used extensively in macroscopic traf-
ﬁc modeling via Wardrop equilibrium in ﬂow networks
[3] with focus on route selection in large, economy-like,
markets of many road users rather than microscopic pair-
wise interactions. Where game theory has been applied to
pairwise traﬃc decisions, it has mostly been at the level of
simple single-shot games as reviewed in [5]. In a few cases
such as lane-changing [10, 7] and merging [8] it has been
extended to sequential games as used here, but not for
AV-pedestrian interactions as here. The meta-strategy
convergence concept used here is novel to our knowledge,
as is the use of the sequential model as a foundation for
AV-human intersection and jaywalking control.
2 Methods
Turn-taking model. In the simplest possible model we
set up two symmetric agents (vehicles or pedestrians) ap-
proaching an intersection as a chess-like, discrete space,
discrete speed, and discrete time, turn-taking game, as in
ﬁg. 1(right). This does not yet use any Game Theory
because the players' decisions are not made at the same
time. We will use it to introduce notation and as a base
to grow more detailed models. We assume a (1 meter)
grid world, with two straight roads at right angles meet-
ing at the intersection. Assume one vehicle on each road,
labeled2 Y and X. (We will later consider one player to
be a pedestrian or diﬀerent types of vehicle.) Assume
discrete alternating turns one per second, in which one
vehicle can choose either a 1m/s or 2m/s speed, i.e. move
either one box forward or two boxes forward. (This en-
sures a ﬁnite game, because the vehicles are guaranteed
to move closer to the intersection at each step. Formally,
y and x are decreasing variants.) 2m/s is a slow real
world speed but is chosen to coincide with simple integer
movements of 1 or 2 boxes per turn. (The reader may
wish to multiply all distances and speeds by 10 if they
wish to think in more real-world units.) Write y for Y 's
distance in meters to the intersection, x for X 's distance
in meters. Assume a crash occurs if the vehicles are in the
same square or if one vehicle is in the intersection square
and the other moves through it in a single step. (This
may be implemented by treating (y, x) ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 1)}
as crash states, and all other states with one agent at 0
or 1 as non-crash endgame states, avoiding the need to
model negative positions beyond the intersection.) We
assign (negative) utility Ucrash to each player for a crash;
otherwise −UtimeT where T is the number of seconds it
takes to reach the intersection from the start of the game,
and Utime is the (positive) value of saving one second of
travel time. Assume that both players have identical util-
ity functions, and know this to be the case. This game
can be played, for example, as a board game between two
human players. The turn-taking model can be solved by
a standard [14] backward induction max-max tree search
as in algorithm 1, where the boolean b represents which
player's turn is current, t is time elapsed, y and x are the
two players' positions, and the results are expected value
pairs for the two players, vy,x,t,b =(v
Y
y,x,t,b, v
X
y,x,t,b).
Sequential chicken model. If we replace turn-taking
by simultaneous action selection by both players at each
discrete 1s turn, the model transforms into a sequence
of Game Theoretic matrix games (sub-games). This is
equivalent to a board game where both players write down
their speed choice (1 or 2) in secret then reveal them and
make the moves together rather than in turns. The pay-
oﬀs of any sub-game at state (y > 1, x > 1, t) become re-
cursive functions of the next states, (y−aY , x−aX , t+1),
2We use the convention of writing Y before X, and the
orientation of the grid world of ﬁg. 1, to match (row,column)
matrix notation.
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Algorithm 1
world_value((y,x,t,b)) =
if y==x==0 or y==x==1
or (y==1 and x==0) or (y==0 and x==1)
or (y==0 and x==-1) or (y==-1 and x==0):
(-100,-100) #crash
if y<=0 or x<=0:
(-t-y/2 , -t-x/2) #someone arrives
if b: #recursion
mymax(world_value((y-2,x,t+1,False)),
world_value((y-1,x,t+1,False)))
if not b: #recursion
yourmax(world_value((y, x-2, t+1, True)),
world_value((y, x-1, t+1, True)))
where aY , aX ∈ {1, 2} are the speed selection actions for
speeds of 1m/s and 2m/s. As in the turn-taking model,
these inductive values are based on the endgame states
when one or both vehicles have reached the intersection
(considered to occur at square 0 or 1). Consider the value
vy,x,t = (v
Y
y,x,t, v
X
y,x,t) of the sub-game when the game is in
state (y, x, t). The induction relation for this sub-game's
payoﬀ matrix is,
vy,x,t = v(
[
v(y − 1, x− 1, t+ 1) v(y − 1, x− 2, t+ 1)
v(y − 2, x− 1, t+ 1) v(y − 2, x− 2, t+ 1)
]
)
and is computable via standard matrix Game Theory.
Optimal mixed strategies, where they exist, and result-
ing state probabilities given an initial start state, for this
model are shown in ﬁg. 2.
Asymmetric utility model. A ﬁnal model asks what
happens if the two players have diﬀerent collision utilities.
This occurs for example if one player has a heavier/safer
car than the other, such as an SUV (Sports Utility Ve-
hicle). Or if one player is a weaker road user such as a
cyclist, or a pedestrian negotiating to cross the road in a
conﬂict zone in front of our AV. Will even a small change
to these utilities break the symmetry of the sequential
chicken model and tip the balance of who yields? If so,
this would give a rational justiﬁcation for the purchase of
heavy vehicles such as SUVs: the intent of such purchases
is not to actually get into collisions and beneﬁt from re-
duced damage, but rather to maintain the possibility,
however remote, of such a disaster, and exploit the back-
ward induction from it to obtain concessions in more be-
nign possible worlds, namely of the other player yielding.
Purchase of an SUV would then be rational, reducing the
cost of time delays to the owner. (There is of course then
a higher level game when the other road users can buy
similar vehicles, beyond the scope of our present model.)
For simplicity we retain the assumption that both play-
ers have the same time delay utilities, as in the previ-
ous model. We assume the original collision-to-time value
scaling of (Ucrash,, Ucrash), and consider ratios where one
player is stronger than the other, as (Ucrash, rUcrash), for
r ∈ [1, 100]. When utilities become asymmetric it is pos-
sible that more equilibria will be present, so we switch to
numerical computation of them using the Lemke-Howson
algorithm.
Meta-strategy convergence. The asymmetric chicken
model may have multiple equilibria which are not fully
disambiguated by dominance and ESS solutions concepts.
We propose a novel (to our knowledge) solution concept
for use in solving this and other models, which we call
meta-strategy convergence. This is based on everything
we currently know about the `rational' process of equi-
librium pruning and selection, including the absence of
information in some cases, and on a temporal ordering of
rational reasoning. After removing dominated and non-
ESS equilibria, we know of no good remaining solution
concepts under the assumption that the other player is
also rational. (Trembling hand, basins etc. make a dif-
ferent assumption about a fallible opponent, but for AVs
which will eventually interact with other autonomous ve-
hicles, we want all players to be completely mechanized
and rational.) In the absence of any other way to se-
lect from the remaining equilibria's strategies, we form a
new meta-strategy which chooses one of them from a ﬂat
(maximum entropy) prior. By symmetry, there is no way
to prefer any over any other, hence their selection proba-
bilities must be equal, given this state of knowledge. Cu-
riously, this is equivalent to a new strategy which averages
the action probabilities from each remaining strategy, yet
is not itself in that set, because it is an average between
them. Hence, it is not a member of any equilibrium and
cannot be an optimal strategy itself. However, we have
derived it step-by-step over time in a completely ratio-
nal way. It is our best solution so far at this new point
in time. As it is our best rational solution at this time,
the other player will also compute that we have reached
it. We then consider, as in standard ﬁctitious play, what
the other player will do next. They will apply ﬁctitious
play to modify their strategy in response. Then we will
modify ours, and they will modify theirs again. This will
iterate until we converge, unambiguously, onto a speciﬁc
and uniquely deﬁned one of the original equilibria. This
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Figure 2: Strategy selection (1) and backward induction state probability (2-3) equations.
P (aY = 1|y, x, t) =
vYy−1,x−2,t+1 − vYy−2,x−2,t+1
vYy−1,x−2,t+1 + v
Y
y−2,x−1,t+1 − vYy−1,x−1,t+1 − vYy−2,x−2,t+1
P (yinit, xinit, tinit) = 1, P (yinit, x 6= xinit, tinit) = 0, P (y 6= yinit, xinit, tinit) = 0
P (y, x, t) =
∑
∆y∈1,2
∑
∆x∈1,2
P (aY = ∆y, aX = ∆x|y −∆y, x−∆x, t− 1)P (y −∆y, x−∆x, t− 1)
contains the rational strategies for both players, and can
be reached deterministically by both of them without the
need for any pre-established conventions or communica-
tions. Like all solution concepts, this is something of a
philosophical rather than purely mathematical argument.
It is the best argument currently known to us so we con-
sider it to be rational for the AV control tasks.
Temporal gauge invariance. The state values of the
game theoretic models above are presented as functions
of (y, x, t) but our current implementation makes use of
an approximation to reduce the number of sub-games to
be solved and thus the computation time. Because both
player's utilities are linear function of time, we may (up
to a small change in the ratio of crash to delay utilities)
choose diﬀerent gauges to measure time, such as consid-
ering the time of every turn game to be t = 0. When
the ﬁrst player, say Y , reaches the intersection, we assign
values (vY0,x, v
X
0,x) = (0,−Utimex/2) as it will takeX a fur-
ther x/2 seconds to reach the intersection at maximum
speed 2m/s now the road is clear. (Also (vY1,x, v
X
1,x) = (0,
−Utime(x− 1)/2) to handle the other required end states
in the same way.) This simpliﬁes all state values and
functions of them to be functions only of (y, x). Remov-
ing dependence on t also makes it simpler to visualize
results as 2D (y, x) matrices.
3 Results
Assume Ucrash = −20 and Utime = 1 throughout. (This
values a crash as being equally bad as a 100 second de-
lay reaching the intersection. In the real world the crash
penalty would be much larger, but smaller ones produce
more easily visualizable results for our present purpose.)
Turn-taking model. The value function for Y in the
turn-taking model is shown in ﬁg. 3. The game is sym-
Figure 3: State values for turn-taking game.
metric so X has the same function when the player's
names are swapped. The turn taking model is fully de-
terministic, because full information is available to each
player when it is their turn. Fig. 4 and 5 show simulated
runs beginning at asymmetric (y 6= x) and symmetric
(y = x) starting states.When the vehicles start with very
diﬀerent diﬀerences, e.g. (y = 12, x = 8) they both pro-
ceed at full speed (2m/s) and avoid each other. When
started at identical distances, such as (y = 10, x = 10),
the initial turn-taking advantage becomes the tie-breaker,
in both parties interests. Collisions never occur in the
turn-taking model due to its determinism.
Sequential chicken model. Fig. 6 shows the value ma-
trix for games with vehicles at up to 20m from the inter-
section, and ﬁg. 7 show the optimal strategies.
Fig. 8 shows the state space probabilities and ﬁg. 9a
stochastic sample, starting with large time (2 seconds)
gap between the vehicles. All probabilities in the state
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Figure 4: Simulation of turn taking game, diﬀering
starts.
Figure 5: Simulation of turn taking game, equal
starts.
Figure 6: Sequential chicken state values.
Figure 7: Sequential chicken optimal strategy.
Figure 8: Sequential chicken state probabilities, from
asymmetric start (12,10).
space are very close to 0 or 1, so the outcome is almost
deterministic as in the turn-taking model of the same set-
ting.
Fig. 10 shows state space probabilities when the vehi-
cles start at identical distances y = x = 10. In this case,
the outcome is diﬀerent from the turn-taking model, be-
cause the game is fully symmetric but the symmetry is
no longer broken by turn-taking. This means that both
players must employ a policy consisting of mixed strate-
gies until the symmetry is broken by one of them. The
optimal policy is to yield with an increasing probability
as distance to collision decreases, as seen in ﬁg. 8. Fig.
11 is a typical sample simulation drawn from the above
state probabilities. The most common outcome is for one
vehicle to begin to yield at a random time, with yield
6
Figure 9: Sequential chicken simulation, from asym-
metric start (12,10).
Figure 10: Sequential chicken state probabilities,
from symmetric start (10,10).
probability increasing as the vehicles draw closer.
Occasionally, as in ﬁg. 12, both players choose to yield
at the same time, prolonging the conﬂict and costing them
both a delay. Very occasionally a collision will occur as
a result of this process, when the players fail to negotiate
priority before both reaching the intersection together.
This is rare, but must have a non-zero probability, com-
puted and denoted as Pcrash.
The collision probability with Ucrash = −20 is 1.79%,
and with Ucrash = −100 it lowers to 0.7%. It is in-
teresting to test how choice of this scaling (versus the
ﬁxed Utime=1) aﬀects the residual collision probability,
because if it has a large eﬀect then any realistic model will
require scaling calibration against some empirical data.
Figure 11: Sequential chicken typical simulation,
from symmetric start (10,10).
Figure 12: Sequential chicken atypical simulation,
from symmetric start (10,10).
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Figure 13:
Assuming that both players continue to share the same
utility function, and know this to be the case, ﬁg. 13
shows the eﬀect of varying the collision utility scale while
keeping the time utilities ﬁxed.
This suggests that choices in range [-1000,0] do have
large eﬀects on the collision probability, but penalties
worse than -1000 are much the same as each other in this
eﬀect. In real life, the cost of crashing a car (even very
slightly) is almost always vastly larger than that of losing
a few seconds journey time. This graph suggests that for
these realistic penalties, the precise choice of shared col-
lision penalty values is unimportant as long as it is over
1000 times worse than a 1 second time delay penalty.
Asymmetric utility model. As hypothesized, asymmet-
ric collision penalties (such as our AV encountering a
strong SUV or a weak cyclist or pedestrian) have a large
eﬀect on who must yield, and with a very small change in
the probability of actual collision. This small change is
the key to breaking symmetry and ensuring strong prob-
ability of the weaker player yielding ﬁg. 14.
4 Conclusion
In all the models, when one agent has any small advantage
it is usually  but probabilistically  optimal for both
agents for the strong one to take the priority and the
weak one to yield.
It is essential that there is some small but strictly non-
zero probability of collision being allowed to occur as a
consequence of both sides' optimal strategies. It is im-
possible for an AV to make any progress at all if this is
not the case, because given this knowledge, every single
other road user could dominate them in any conﬂict - even
pedestrians jumping out in front of them for fun as seen
Figure 14:
in real-world trials [9]. Under these models, it is essential
that AVs are programmed with a non-zero probability of
deliberately causing a collision. This may be legally dif-
ﬁcult, as such programming may be argued to constitute
not only manslaughter but also murder, being rationally
pre-meditated by the software engineer.
These results are interesting as they suggests that pur-
chasing SUVs, or armoring our autonomous vehicle like
an SUV, is a very rational strategy, not in order to better
survive the rare collisions that do occur, but to ensure a
high probability of other vehicles getting out of our way to
save our time and money on delays. By adding armor to
our own vehicle we can make the optimal strategy for the
other player yielding tend towards certainty at every en-
counter.This also models what will happen when our AV
encounters a pedestrian. The larger cost of collision to
the pedestrian than to our AV gives us a strong position,
from which we can act aggressively and be conﬁdent that
the pedestrian will yield. The answer to `When should
the chicken cross then road?' is `quite rarely if there is a
car coming, but with non-zero probability'.
We found that the way in which the models quantize
time is important. The turn-taking model artiﬁcially re-
moved most of the subtly of game theory by breaking its
symmetry via the turn taking mechanism itself. This sug-
gests that such a quantization is not a good model for the
real world, it hides the main problem of the scenario from
the start. A related modeling issue around time relates
to Zeno's Paradox. In the models presented here, time
ticks are discrete and of equal length. It might be argued
that two Zeno-like players could choose to deﬁne each of
their ticks to have half the duration of the previous one,
and thus create an inﬁnite number of ticks which would
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be certain to eventually lead to an asymmetric yield and
avoidance of collision. Formal mathematical analysis of
this claim could form future work, though in practice, any
human or machine compute system has some ﬁnite limit
on its computation speed.
Extended models should handle speed more realisti-
cally. Rather than just two discrete speeds, a contin-
uum of speeds should be available, including stopping at
a complete halt. Continuous speeds may require sampling
approximations to compute over, while complete halts al-
low for potentially inﬁnite time games which require fur-
ther consideration to model. Human drivers when faced
with, for example, a busy motorway merge, may gradu-
ally slow down towards a halt at the end of the slip-road,
while drivers in their path may do the same. Perhaps un-
der a continuous speed model this behavior can be shown
to converge safely as everyone slows down towards a halt
and reduces both the probability and penalty of collisions.
Nevertheless, the underlying logic must still hold - that
there must be a credible threat of a non-zero probability
of causing some collision, in order that the other party
cannot take advantage of the AV every time. Future mod-
els should add further realistic details to the framework.
Real drivers do not know each other's utility functions
and must infer them in an information game during the
interaction. This could include giving and reading signals
about utility such as the model, age, colour and cleanli-
ness of their cars, their lateral positions on the road, their
facial expressions and hand gestures as well as more for-
mal car signaling via light ﬂashing and horn usage. Real
drivers may not have Markovian time delay utilities and
more detailed models should allow for time dimensioned
value functions v(y, x, t) rather than than simpler v(y, x)
used here. Traﬃc regulations and conventions such as
legally binding and non-binding signs and lights, and the
cost of public humiliation or legal action for being seen or
recorded breaking them should be added to modify util-
ities. Such models suggest new signaling conventions for
autonomous vehicles, such as use of V2V radio communi-
cations and virtual currencies to aid negotiations.
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